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PREFACE 
I n  t h i s  pape r ,  t h e  au thor  s t u d i e s  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of 
p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous f u n c t i o n s ,  which r e p r e s e n t  a  sub- 
c l a s s  of t h e  set of q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n s .  I t  i s  
shown t h a t  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  can be used t o  d e r i v e  some new 
r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  t heo ry  of coopera t ive  games. 
This  paper  i s  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  r e s e a r c h  on nondif-  
f e r e n t i a b l e  op t imiza t ion  c u r r e n t l y  underway w i t h i n  t h e  
System and Decis ion Sc iences  program. 
ANDRZE J WIERZBICKI 
Chairman 
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POSITIVELY HOMOGENEOUS QUASIDIFFERENTIABLE FUNCTIONS 
AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY 
S . L. PECHERSKY 
Institute for Socia l and Economic Prob lems, USSR 
Academy of Sciences, ul. Voinova 50-a, Leningrad 
19801 5, USSR 
Received 28 December 1983 
One interesting class of quasidifferentiable functions 
is that formed by the family of positively homogeneous 
functions. In this paper, the author studies the pro- 
perties of these functions and uses them to derive some 
new results in the theory of cooperative games. 
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1. Introduction 
We shall begin by recalling the definition of quasidifferen- 
tiability (for more information on the properties of quasidif- 
ferentiable functions see [51). Let a finite-valued functio.n 
f: S - El be defined on an open set S C E . 
n 
Definition 1 [5]. A function f is said to be quasidifferentiable 
at a point x E S if it is differentiable at x in every direction 
g E En and there exist convex compact sets af - (x) C E and n 
- 
af(x) c E such that n 
afo= max (v,g)+ min (w,g) Y g E E  
a g vfaf (XI w~af(x) n (1 
The p a i r  of s e t s  Df (x)  = [ af - (x)  ,z f  (x)  ] i s  c a l l e d  a  quasi- 
differential of t h e  funct ion  f  a t  t h e  po in t  x  and t h e  s e t s  
a f ( x )  - and %f (x )  a r e  c a l l e d  a  subdifferential and a  superdif- 
ferential, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  of f  a t  x  . 
In  what fol lows we s h a l l  consider  a  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous 
funct ion  f  , i . e . ,  
f  (Ax) = Xf (x )  W X Z O .  - ( 2 )  
Let K be a  convex cone i n  E with a  compact base and a  
n 
non-empty i n t e r i o r .  We s h a l l  suppose t h a t  T i s  t h e  base of 
t h i s  cone, where dim T < n  ; l e t ! r i T  denote t h e  r e l a t i v e  i n t e r i o r  
of the .  s e t  T , and % t h e  a f f i n e  h u l l  of T . 
Def in i t ion  2. A function f:T - E l  is said to be quasidifferen- 
tiable at a point x  E r i T  if it is differentiable at this point 
in every direction g  E $ = I$, - x  and convex compact sets 
a f ( x )  , z T f ( x )  C $ exist such that 
-T 
The following propos i t ion  i s  an immediate c o r o l l a r y  of 
t h e s e  d e f i n i t i o n s .  
Proposi t ion 1. Let a function f:K - El  be quasidifferentiable 
at a point x  E i n t  K . Then the function f l  
T (x tp )  , where 
T(x,p)  = { z  E K I  (z-x,p) = 01 , p  E En , is quasidifferentiable 
at x  , and its quasidifferential is defined by the pair [ A , B ] ,  
where 
and Pr C represents the orthogonal projection of a set C on the 
P 
hyperplane 
Quasidifferentiability of a positively homogeneous extension 
Let us suppose that the function F:K -- El is the positively 
homogeneous extension to the cone K of a function f defined on 
the set T(x,x) , x E int K . Let f be quasidifferentiable at x . 
Theorem 1. The function is quasidifferentiable at x and moreover 
Proof. Since f is quasidifferentiable, the equality 
af(x) - 
ah max (v,h) + min (w,h) , 
v ~ a  - f (XI wfTf (x) 
holds for every direction 
and 
-4-  
Le t  us  cons ide r  an a r b i t r a r y  d i r e c t i o n  g  E En and suppose 
t h a t  
g  # Xx f o r e v e r y  X E E ,  . 
Consider 
It  i s  clear t h a t  
2 
where llxll = (x,x) . L e t  
Then h E Hx and w e  have t h e  fo l lowing  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n :  
where 
(Note t h a t  h#O because g#Xx.) It  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  X--+O i f f  v--+O 
and t h u s  we have 
= l i m  i f (x+vh) - f (x)  + f (x+,,h) A 4 0  X 11 x  11 2 
i f (x+ph)  - f ( x )  . 2 Ilxll + (g ,x)  - = l i m  1.140 !J Il x  ll 
+ f  (x )  0 
n x n  
Hence f o r  every  gfXx t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  a F  e x i s t s  and 
where h  i s  def ined  by ( 6 ) .  
From ( 3 )  w e  then  g e t  
a h )  - llxl12 + (g ,x)  
2 max (v ,h )  + ' g i n  (w,h) + ag II x II vfaf ( X I  wfaf ( X I  I 
Since  t h e  func t ion  a F  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous i n  g  , 
it i s  enough t o  assume t h a t  g  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  cond i t ion  
11xl12 + (g ,x)  > 0  . 
Then, t ak ing  ( 6 )  i n t o  account ,  w e  have 
aF(x )  , -  
- max v , g - x  
a g  vfaf ( X I  i 11 x 11 2 
Since af - (x)  , zf (x )  C H~ , 
a l ( x )  - 
- 
ag max (v ,g)  + g i n  (wig) + -=+ (g ,x)  = vfaf ( X I  w ~ a f  ( X I  II x II 
- max (v ,g)  + g i n  (w,g) 
f x  
v f t f  (x) ++ x ~a f  ( X I  
II X II 
Now we have t o  check t h a t  t h i s  formula holds f o r  g  E Hx and 
g+x f o r  some X f O  . 
I f  g  Hx , then (g ,x)  = 0  and 
max ( v t g )  = max (v ,g)  - 
f x  + a f ( X ~ + - + ~  - vfaf ( X I  
Il x  ll 
Let us suppose t h a t  g=Xx f o r  some X # O  . Then 
But from ( 4 )  we have 
max (v,Xx) + min (w,Xx) = 
f x  
vfaf  - ( X )  ++ w f ~ f  (x )  
II X II 
thus  proving t h e  theorem. 
3. Game-theoretical applications of quasidifferentiable 
functions 
Now let us consider the game-theoretical applications of 
quasidifferentiable functions. The study of so-called fuzzy 
or generalized games is currently attracting a great deal of 
interest. We will not go into the reasons for this here (but 
see J.-P. Aubin [ 1-3 ] on this topic) : we shall simply recall 
the main definitions. 
Let I=l:n be a set of n players. We can then identify an 
arbitrary set S C I , called a c o a l i t i o n ,  with a charac- 
S teristic vector e , where e=U= (1,. . . ,1) E E and eS is the 
n 
projection of vector e on the subspace 
nS = {x E E ~ ~ x ~ = o  for i 9 S} . 
Thus the set of all coalitions is {O, 1 ln . 
The set of generalized (fuzzy) coalitions is, by definition, 
the convex hull co{O, 1 ln=[ O,l] n = ~ n  . Hence a generalized co- 
alition r E In associates with each player i E I a participation 
rate r E [0,1] , which is a number between 0 and 1 . i 
Definition 3 [3]. An n-person  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o o p e r a t i v e  game 
( w i t h  s i d e  payments )  i s  d e f i n e d  by a  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous 
1 f u n c t i o n  v: [ 0,l l n  -. El which  a s s i g n s  a  p a y o f f  v(r) E R t o  each  
g e n e r a l i z e d  c o a l i t i o n  r E [ O,lln . The f u n c t i o n  v i s  c a l l e d  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  game. 
+ Since v is positively homogeneous we can extend v to En by 
setting 
+ for r E En , r#O . 
We shall take the vector space En as the space of outcomes 
(or multi-utilities) . Vector x= (x , . . . ,xn) E E~ 1 represents the 
utilities of the players; the utility of the generalized co- 
n 
alition r is given by (r,x)= 2 r x . If S C I , then this 
i=l i i 
S 
utility is equal to (e ,XI= 2 x 
iES i ' 
It is well-known (see, for example, [I , 2 1 )  that the direc- 
tional derivative may be used to define the solutions of a game. 
In an extension of this idea, J.-P. Aubin has proposed that the 
Clarke subdifferential could be used to define a set of solu- 
tions to locally Lipschitzian games, i.e., games with a locally 
Lipschitzian characteristic function. 
Definition 4 [ 3 1 .  We say that the Clarke subdifferentiat 
aC1v(U) of v a t  U is the set of sotutions S(v) to a locatty 
Lipschitzian game with characteristic function v . 
The following properties of the set S(v) are worthy of note: 
(a) S(v) is non-empty, compact and convex 
n 
(b) S(v) is Pareto-optimal, i.e., if x E S (v) , then Z xi=v(U) 
i=l 
(c) S(Av) = AS (v) for A E E~ 
(dl S (u+v) C S (u) + S (v) 
(e) If v is superadditive, then S(v) coincides with the core 
(f) If v is continuously differentiable at U , then S (v) =Vv (U) , 
i.e., S(v) contains only one element which coincides with 
the generalized Shapley value of the game v . 
Defin i t ion  5. A generalized game is said to be quasidifferen- 
tiable if its characteristic function is quasidifferentiable. 
Remark 1 .  Since q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  only on 
t h e  diagonal  of cube 1" then from Theorem 1 and the  p o s i t i v e  
homogeneity of funct ion  v  it i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  assume t h a t  v  
i s  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  only a t  U . 
Let v b e q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and its q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a l  be 
[ cv (U)  , a v ( ~ ) ]  . From Proposi t ion 1 we deduce t h a t  t h e  func- 
1 t i o n  v  = v I ~ ( ~ , ~ )  i s  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  a t  U with a  quasi-  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  def ined  by t h e  p a i r  [ P r u  av - ( U )  , P r u  av ( U )  1 . I t  
i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous extens ion  of t h e  
+ funct ion  v1 on En coinc ides  with v  ; t h e  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a l  of 
t h i s  funct ion  a t  U , which may be found using Theorem 1 ,  i s  
I t  is a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  p a i r  i s  i n  some sense "Pareto- 
opt imal" ,  s i n c e  f o r  x  € P r a  Cv(U) + U and y  E P r u 8 v ( U )  
H-u 11 
we have 
(because P r u  ?v( l I )  , P r u  8v( t I )  C H E )  . 
Let D'V(U) be a  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a l  of v  a t  U which i s  Pareto- 
optimal i n  t h e  sense descr ibed above. We then have t h e  following 
d e f i n i t i o n :  
Def in i t ion  6. The quasidifferential D'V ( U )  of the characteristic 
function v  at the point U i s  called a quasisolution of the game. 
There are at least two reasons for using the term "quasi- 
solution". Firstly, it is known that quasidifferentials are 
not unique and are defined up to the equivalence relation. We 
should also note that a locally Lipschitzian function is not 
necessarily quasidifferentiable and vice versa. Moreover, it 
is obvious that a function which is both locally Lipschitzian 
and quasidifferentiable may have both a directional derivative 
and an upper Clarke derivative, which are essentially different 
quantities. 
Quasisolutions also possess certain properties which go 
some way towards justifying their name. 
1. If a characteristic function v is continuously differentiable 
at U , then D*V (u) = [ Vv(U) , 01 , where Vv (U) is the 
gradient of v at U and a quasisolution can be identified 
with the generalized value of the game. 
2. If v is concave (i.e., superadditive), then DTv(U) = [o,$v(u)], 
where xv (u) is the superdifferential of the concave func- 
tion v and the quasisolution DTv(U) can be identified with 
the core of the game. 
3. Quasisolutions are linear on v . 
Remark 2. In general, if one element of a quasidifferential 
is zero, then it is natural to regard the corresponding quasi- 
solution as a solution of the game. 
Finally, using the properties of quasidifferentials we can 
find quasisolutions of the maximum and minimum games of a finite 
number of quasidifferentiable games, and thus we may speak about 
the calculus of quasisolutions. 
Let us now consider the directional derivative 
This value shows the marginal gain of coalition U when a 
new coalition g joins the existing coalition U . (We do not 
assume that g E E: , and hence this vector can have negative 
components. Such components may be interpreted as the "damage" 
caused to the corresponding players or alternatively as an in- 
dication that they should leave the whdle set of players). 
Since representation (1) holds for a quasidifferentiable 
game, it is interesting to consider the vectors x (g) and y(g) 
at which the corresponding maximum and minimum are attained. 
Since dv(U) and ZV(U) are convex compact sets, the sets 
~ r g  max C (x,g) [x E av(U) 1 
and 
consist of only one element for almost every g E S n- 1 
Let G (v) denote the set of such g , and z (g) =x (g) +y (g) . 
Note that if the function v is both locally Lipschitzian and 
quasidifferentiable and also satisfies some additional property 
(which is too cumbersome to describe here--see Demyanov [ 4 ] ) ,  
then the points z(g), g E G(v) , describe all extreme points of 
the Clarke subdifferential of v at U (the set of solutions pro- 
posed by J.-P. Aubin). 
4. Solution of quasidifferentiable games 
We shall now define the solution of a quasidifferentiable 
game, which we shall call an st-solution. We require the fol- 
lowing additional definition: 
Definition 7 [ 6 1 .  Let  K be a  compact convex  s e t  i n  En . The 
S t e i n e r  p o i n t  o f  t h e  s e t  K i s  t h e  p o i n t  
1 
s (K) = - a~(K,a)dX , 
an s 
n-1 
where X i s  t h e  Lebesque measure on t h e  u n i t  sphere  S i n  En , 
an 
is t h e  volume o f  t h e  u n i t  b a l l  i n  En , a i s  a  v a r i a b l e  
n- 1 
v e c t o r  on S and p(K,-) i s  t h e  suppor t  f u n c t i o n  o f  K . 
Note that we always have s(K) E K and s (-K)=-s (K) . Let 
v be a quasidifferentiable characteristic function with quasi- 
differential 
Definition 8. The s t - s o l u t i o n  o f  a  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  game 
w i t h  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  v i s  t h e  v e c t o r  st(v) d e f i n e d  by 
t h e  e q u a l i t y  
We first have to prove that this definition does not depend 
upon the pair defining a particular quasidifferential v (such 
a quasidifferential may not even be "Pareto-optimal"). This 
follows immediately from the linearity on K (with respect to 
vector addition of sets) of the function s defined by (9), and 
from the following obvious property of quasidifferentials: if 
[A,B] is a quasidifferential of v at x , then the pair [ A ~ . B ~ ]  
is also a quasidifferential of v at x if and only if 
A - B 1  = A 1  - B .  
Using the equality (11) and the linearity of s we get 
The vector st(v) can be interpreted as the vector of average 
marginal utilities received by the players. 
We shall now describe some properties of st-solutions. 
Proposition 2. I f  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  game i s  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ,  
t h e n :  
1. The mapping st:v + st(v) i s  l i n e a r  i n  v . 
2 .  The s t - s o l u t i o n  i s  Pareto-opt imal ,  i .  e . ,  
3. I f  v i s  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ,  t h e n  st (v) =Vv(U) and 
t h e  s t - s o l u t i o n  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h t h e g e n e r a l i z e d S h a p Z e ~ v a Z u e  o f  v. 
4 .  I f  v i s  concave ( s u p e r a d d i t i v e ) ,  t h e n  st(v) i s  t h e  S t e i n e r  
p o i n t  o f  t h e  core  o f  t h e  game. 
The proof of t h i s  propositianEollowsimmediately from Pro- 
p o s i t i o n  1 ,  Theorem 1 ,  and the d e f i n i t i o n  of q u a s i s o l u t i o n s .  
Nowlet  u s p r o v e  twomore i m p o r t a n t p r o p e r t i e s  of an s t - s o l u t i o n :  
it s a t i s f i e s  t h e  "dummy" axiom (Theorem 2 )  and i s  symmetric (Theorem 3) . 
L e t a  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e g a m e  have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  v  
+ 
such t h a t  v  ( x )  =v ( x " ~ )  f o r  every  x  E En . Then f o r  eve ry  g  E En w e  have 
v(uI\i+AgI\il - V ( U  I\i 
= l i m  
X+O X 
It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  f u n c t i o n  ;=v l  is  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  
R  
a t  lI1\i and i t s - q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a l  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  is  de f ined  by t h e  
p a i r  [ P r - @ ( E )  , P r  Zv(l I ) ]  , where P r  A is the p r o j e c t i o n  of A on 
R i  . Hence, from ( 1  2)  , t h i s  p a i r  is  t h e  q u a s i d i f f e r e n t i a l  of 
a t  I[. ~ h u s  if x E p r ( a v ( U ) )  and y  E ~ r ( z v ( u ) )  t hen  xi'O 1 
- 
Y i  =0 . From t h i s  w e  have ( s t ( v ) )  i=O and t h e  fo l lowing  theorem 
holds .  
Theorem 2 .  If a quasidifferentiable game with characteristic 
n function v is such that v ( x ) = ~ ( x I \ ~ )  for every x E [ o ,  11 , 
then (st  (v)) i=O . 
I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  func t ion  s t ( - )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  so -ca l l ed  
dummy axiom, which s t a t e s  t h a t  a  (dummy) p l a y e r  who g i v e s  no th ing  
t o  any c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  r e c e i v e  no th ing .  
"Nothing w i l l  come of no th ing"  
Shakespeare,  King Lear 
Suppose now that v is quasidifferentiable and r is a per- 
mutation of the set of players I=l:n . We shall define the 
game r*v as follows: r*v(x)=v(x r...rX 
-1 1 
r -I (1 1, .rr (n) 
~ e t  (n-'xli = x - 1 and (rx) = x 
.rr (i) ri ' 
Theorem 3. The st-soZution is symmetric, i. e., st (r*v)=r st(v) 
- 
Proof. If [ - av(lI) , av(U)] is a quasidifferential of v at lI , 
then 
I v (U+X (r-lq) 1 avcu = lim -v(u))= a(r-ll) ?,--to X 
Hence 
ar*v(u) - 
- 
- 1 -1 
max (z,r g) + min (y,r g) = 
ag zECv ( lI yEZv ( lI 
- 
- 1 
max (nzrr(r g)) + min (ny,r(r-lg)) = 
ZECV (U) Yav(lI) 
- 
 max (z,g) + min (y,g) . 
ZET(~V(U)) - + ~(TV(Z)) 
Thus [r(av(lI) - ),r (zv(lI)) 1 is a quasidifferential of r*v at lI . 
Since the Steiner point is invariant under orthogonal trans- 
formations of En then 
-1 6- 
s('IT~v(u)) - = 'ITS(~V(U)I , s('ITZV(U)) = 'ITS(ZV(U)) 
and hence 
s~('IT*v) = 'IT s~(v) 1 
which is the proposition of the theorem. 
It is clear that the above formula holds for every or- 
thogonal transformation of En which leaves the vector U un- 
changed. 
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